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C. Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) , Utah Code. The pour over into this Court is 
pursuant to Rule 4A(a), R. Utah S. Ct. See also Rule 3 and 4, 
R. Utah Ct. App. 
D. Nature of Proceedings 
This is an appeal from the order granting a Writ of 
Restitution to plaintiff/respondent Olympus Hills and evicting 
defendant/appellant Wasatch Bowling. It was poured over into 
this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
E. Statement of Issues on Appeal 
I. In an action sounding unlawful detainer for nonpayment of 
rent, may the court award judgment of restitution based upon 
other grounds (e.g. common law breach of contract)? 
II. Where an action is begun with a complaint and three day 
summons in unlawful detainer, and where subsequent payments have 
exceeded the amount originally sought/ is it error to grant 
restitution without requiring a new unlawful detainer notice? 
- vi -
III. Is it error for the court to certify a partial judgment 
for appeal when judgment is not yet granted as to other relief 
sought in the same claim for relief and cause of action? 
IV. Was it error to require two supersedeas bondsf and was the 
amount excessive? 
V. Was it error for the court to issue its Writ of Restitution 
without a written order determining the sufficiency of the 
supersedeas bonds? 
F. Determinative statutes 
The statutes and rules which Wasatch believes may be 
determinative are copied or set forth in their entirety in 
Appendix I hereto. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from partial summary judgment granting 
to Plaintiff-Respondent Olympus Hills ["Olympus"] a Writ of 
Restitution, evicting defendant-appellant Wasatch Bowling, Inc. 
["Wasatch"] from possession of a bowling alley. Granting the 
Writ was certified as immediately appealable. Stay of the writ 
to allow continued possession pending appeal was was refused 
because the trial court only approved one of two $300,000 
supersedeas bonds. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Olympus served Wasatch with a three day notice to pay 
rent or quit, and sued Wasatch December 31, 1987 (a few weeks 
later). The complaint contained a single claim for relief, 
alleging default under a bowling alley lease in the amount of 
nearly $17,000. R. 1-4. The complaint alleged unlawful 
detainer of the premises commencing December 8, 1987, asking 
treble damages therefor, R. 3, and sought restitution of the 
premises, citing specifically to the unlawful detainer chapter 
in the Utah Code. 
The action was commenced by a summons (served January 5, 
1987) with the response time shortened to three days, by 
authority of the unlawful detainer statute. R. 50, 55-56. 
Olympus moved to amend its complaint nearly a year later, 
on December 20, 1988. R. 89-91. The Amended Complaint 
acknowledged that the parties had entered into a Letter 
Agreement June 20, 1988 (after the Complaint and before the 
Amended Complaint). R. 92. A copy of the Letter Agreement is 
attached hereto as Appendix II. 
Wasatch objected to the amended complaint, asserting that 
(R. 97-98): 
1. The action was commenced as one of unlawful 
detainer, with a three days summons, but 
2. The proposed amendment appeared to abandon that 
- viii -
claimf and to sue instead for breach of contract/ so 
3. Plaintiff could not now convert it into a general 
lawsuit for damages. 
The amendment was permitted and is the operative 
pleading. R. 95-96. A copy of it is attached as Appendix III. 
It still asserted a single claim for relief or cause of action/ 
alleging defaulted lease installments under both the original 
lease and the Letter Agreement. The Amended Complaint claimed 
that Olympus was entitled to immediate restitution under the 
terms of the original lease "as amended." It sought judgment of 
$140/990.54. R. 91. Unlike the original complaint/ it did not 
cite to the unlawful detainer statute. 
Olympus moved almost immediately for partial summary 
judgment, limited to a request for restitution of the premises 
and eviction of Wasatch. R. 104-105. In support of the motion 
Olympus simply recited that the lease and Letter Agreement 
existed/ and that Wasatch had defaulted on its payments. R. 
106-107. No authority was cited/ and the only ground set forth 
for restitution of the premises was Section 24.01 of the 
original lease. R. 107. Unlawful detainer statutes were not 
mentioned. 
Wasatch responded/ asserting (among other things) that 
Section 24.01 of the lease was superseded by the later Letter 
Agreement. R. 113-115. 
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C. Disposition at Trial 
After oral argument April 14 , partial summary judgment 
was granted without trial April 28/ 1989. The order (R. 
151-152/ attached as Appendix IV) awarded restitution of the 
premises to Olympus and evicted Wasatch. And pursuant to Rule 
54(b) the order was certified as final/ requiring immediate 
appeal. Id. 
No evidenciary hearing was held/ and therefore no 
citation to a transcript is necessary or possible. 
Wasatch filed its Notice of Appeal May 26/ 1989. A Writ 
of Restitution was issued May 30/ R. 184-185/ and again June 
28th (after disputes over supersedeas bonds). R. 251-252. 
D. Bond Procedings 
Wasatch filed a $50/000 supersedeas bond on May 26thr and 
moved for its approval (R.156-59). Olympus excepted to the 
bond/ R. 161-162. Wasatch justified its surety. R. 171-176. 
On June 6 Judge Daniels (sitting for Judge Wilkinson) 
approved a $100/000 supersedeas bond of Rancho Lanesf Inc.f 
subject to Olympus' right to require justification. R. 177-178. 
Upon justification/ Judge Daniels on June 15th rejected 
the surety proposed by Wasatch as being too low, and required 
two sureties (unless a licensed/ professional surety was used)/ 
each bound in the amount of $300/000. R. 205-207. Two bonds 
were filed in that amount. R. 189-193f 210-215. Financial 
statements showing the worth of the sureties were filed. R. 
232-236. The sureties were again challenged by Olympus. 
On June 20 by minute entry Judge Wilkinson ordered: "the 
Court approves the bonds filed by the defendant and a corporate 
surety bond shall be filed in place of the personal bonds by 
June 22nd." R. 243. No written order was entered. 
On June 26 the court heard Olympus1 latest exceptions to 
Wasatch's sureties. Its minute entry states that the court 
"finds the bonds filed by Rancho and Morris are acceptable but 
are not sufficient to meet the obligation. (H)The court orders 
the defendant post a surety bond of $300,000 by 12:00 noon June 
27th, the sheriff can be in standby position to take the 
property. Defendant's counsel's request to pay the rental is 
denied." R. 244. Again, the file reflects no written order. 
Despite the vagueness of the minute entry, the sum and 
substance is that Rancho Lanes, Inc. had appeared at the hearing 
and satisfied the court it was worth the $300,000 bond it had 
filed. The court required a second bond, which had been filed 
by Mr. Morse. Although his financial statement and affidavit 
showed a net worth in excess of $2.4 million (R. 246-250), the 
court refused to accept the bond because he was unable to appear 
at the appropriate time to be cross examined by Olympus. 
On June 29, 1989, despite the supersedeas bonds filed and 
without a current written order, the Writ of Execution was 
served and the locks changed. R. 257. 
E. Relevant Facts 
Olympus Hills leased bowling alley space to Wasatch in 
September, 1984. Certain payments by appellants under the lease 
were defaulted upon and/or checks for such payments were 
dishonored. This action was filed as one for unlawful detainer. 
Over a year after the complaint was filed (about July 13, 1988), 
the parties reached an agreement modified and in part superseded 
the prior agreement and the conditions which existed at the time 
of the filing of the complaint, as to payment terms, amounts, 
etc. Appendix II. 
Respondent moved for partial summary judgment, which is 
the order granted by the trial court over appellant's 
opposition. The trial court ruled there was no just reason for 
delay and made the partial judgment final as to the eviction 
issues. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's unlawful detainer statute offers quick, harsh 
remedies. Its use and applicability must be narrowly permitted 
to the specified circumstances. 
This case began as an unlawful detainer action. Many 
months later, the entire relationship of the parties was altered 
by agreement. Still several more months after that, the 
complaint was amended and Olympus received its Writ of 
Restitution. A new action at common law, or at least a new 
unlawful detainer action, was necessary. 
Olympus having asserted only one claim for relief, the 
court could not purport to certify only part of the lawsuit for 
appeal. And the supersedeas bonds on file should not have been 
disregarded, nor should two of them have been required. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Unlawful detainer remedies are harsh. This case, 
where a large, ongoing bowling business was destroyed by Writ of 
Restitution, is a classic example. 
2. The unlawful detainer act must be strictly construed. 
Court have recognized this because of its harshness. Van 
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). Once 
having commenced the action as one for unlawful detainer, the 
applicable statute (Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code) must be 
complied with to the letter. 
3 . The Letter Agreement changed the whole face of the 
action. Appendix I constitutes a second agreement, executed 
long after the unlawful detainer action was filed, under which 
Wasatch was permitted to remain in possession. Since continued 
possession was allowed and the lease amount altered, it is clear 
that the three day notice to pay rent or quit, and the 
subsequent three day unlawful detainer summons had been 
superseded. 
Later the court erroneously permitted Olympus to amend 
its complaint, excising all references to the unlawful detainer 
statute, asserting breach of the lease agreement and the letter 
agreement. Despite the Letter Agreement, passage of a year 
since the three day notice, and the absence of a forfeiture 
clause in the Letter Agreement, the amended complaint still 
sought restitution. 
4. Without a forfeiture clause, Olympus cannot evict 
Wasatch. As stated, the Letter Agreement contained new terms 
for payment of rent. Some amounts were paid and accepted 
pursuant to the agreement, and Wasatch was allowed to remain in 
possession. No forfeiture was provided for in the letter, nor 
did it incorporate the forfeiture clause of the original lease. 
In fact, the Letter Agreement provides that it shall run 
for two years, after which the lease agreement kicks back in. 
See Appendix I, R. 89. 
A forfeiture clause may allow termination of a leasehold 
prior to its term. However, here the term is contained in the 
Letter Agreement/ and only after it runs its two year course in 
mid-1990 does the forfeiture clause arguably apply. 
In the absence . . . of an express forfeiture 
provision/ the lessor's remedy is generally a claim 
for damages. This is true whether the breach is 
for nonpayment of rent/ nonpayment of taxes/ waste/ 
etc. 
Hackford v. Snowy 657 P.2d 1271/ 1275 (Utah 1982). The Letter 
agreement reaffirmed the validity of the leasef and Wasatch1s 
rights under it. 
Since there was no applicable forfeiture clause/ Olympus 
(and the court) must rely upon a statutory remedy to evict 
Wasatch for violation of the Letter Agreement. Id. at 1275; 
Lambert v. Siney 123 Utah 145/ 256 P.2d 241 (1953). This 
appeal is hampered by the fact Olympus did not make clear the 
authority under which forfeiture was sought. 
Any attempt to comply with the special requirements for 
an unlawful detainer eviction was accomplished many months 
before the parties entered into the Letter Agreement and 
reaffirmed the lease. Attempted compliance was even more 
distant in time from any breach of that new agreement. 
5. Statutory eviction required proper notices and 
demands. 
The basis of a suit in unlawful detainer is 
unlawful possession/ and a tenant . . . is not 
holding unlawfully until he fails to comply with 
the demands of a notice which has been served upon 
him. 
Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944), quoted 
in Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Utah 1982)- The 
notice provisions must be strictly complied with. Hackford at 
1276. In that case, a statutorily correct notice did not 
suffice to put the lessee in unlawful detainer, since it came at 
the wrong time. The lessee had exercised an option to purchase 
two months earlier. Id. 
6. The notices must be correct and timely. See, Id.; 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). 
They were served a year early. To hold that any method of 
eviction other than that required by the statute would be to 
nullify the intent of the legislature. See, Carstensen v. 
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944) (regarding improper 
service of notice); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 
446 (1954). 
A statute upon which Olympus must rely states in part: 
. . If the unlawful detainer charged is after 
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall 
state the amount of rent due. The court shall 
indorse on the summons the number of days within 
which the defendant is required to appear 
and defendant the action. . . . 
§ 78-36-8, Utah Code. Here the amended complaint asks for 
restitution after default in the payment of rent. Yet the 
complaint was filed before the Letter Agreement on which default 
was claimed was even signed. And the only indorsement on the 
summons also took place at that early date. The tenant for a 
term of years can only be guilty of unlawful detainer if he 
continues in possession . . . after default in the 
payment of rent and after notice in writing 
requiring in the alternative the payment of the 
rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has 
remained uncomplied with for a period of three days 
after service, which notice may be served at any 
time after the rent becomes due. 
§ 78-36-3(1)(c), Utah Code (emphasis supplied), 
Olympus1 procedure, allowed by the trial court, prevented 
Wasatch from enjoying its statutory right to cure after notice, 
which could only be served after the rent became due. The 
legislature clearly intended that even defaulting tenants have 
those specific rights before their homes or going business 
concerns may be summarily forfeited. Olympus cannot sue and 
give its notices once, settle with the tenant, and then tack 
prior compliance with the statute onto future defaults in 
different amounts under a new or modified agreement. 
Here the amended complaint claimed about ten times the 
amount of unpaid rent which was alleged in the original 
complaint just a year earlier. As indicated, to achieve an 
unlawful detainer eviction "the complaint shall state the amount 
of rent due." § 78-36-8, Utah Code. A complaint so notifying 
the court and the tenant, after appropriate statutory notice of 
the amount due, is required. That did not occur here. 
Wasatch alleged that the payments made to Olympus after 
the initial unlawful detainer complaint was filed exceeded the 
nearly $17,000 alleged default at that time. R. 80. Trial 
should have been had, since if this allegation is true, it 
further nullifies the first three day notice and three day 
summons. 
7. Olympus accepted rent, waiving its right to 
restitution. Olympus accepted from Wasatch rent payments for 
the months of April and May, 1989, following the April 14 
argument on partial summary judgment of restitution (but before 
the order was signed). See, R. 216. Olympus delayed 14 days 
in getting the court to sign the order of eviction, and 47 days 
before causing a writ of restitution to issue. Such actions 
constitute a waiver of the restitution to which Olympus may have 
been entitled. 
Continued acceptance of rent constitutes, as a matter of 
law, at lease a new month to month rental, possession of under 
which could be terminated only after a fifteen day notice under 
§ 78-36-3(2), Utah Code. 
8. The restitution order was improperly certified for 
appeal. When the order was entered permitting Olympus to evict 
Wasatch, Judge Wilkinson ruled that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there was "no just reason for 
delay" and directed the partial judgment be entered as a "final 
judgment." Yet in the same order he specified that the court 
may determine the amount of rent and other expenses due at a 
later date. R. 151-152. 
This gratuitous certification for appeal was not even 
requested in Olympus' motion or memoranda (though it was sought 
orally, and opposed by Wasatch). Its effect, together with 
Judge Wilkinson's rejection of supersedeas bonds, insured 
Olympus would be able to throw Wasatch out immediately, without 
a chance to fully determine the respective rights of the 
parties. 
9* Judgment may not be final as to part of a single 
claim. Neither the summary judgment rule nor the rule on 
certification for appeal would permit that. Rules 54(b), 56(c) 
& (d) , URCP. Here the complaint stated only one claim or cause 
of action: unlawful detainer. The amended complaint still 
alleged only one cause of action: common law breach of the 
Letter Agreement and lease. R. 89-91. 
10. Only separate "claims" may be certified. The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in 
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party claim . . . , the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only 
upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In 
the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims . . . and the order or other form 
of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims. • • • 
54(b), URCP. 
The rule may only have effect when more than one claim 
for relief is presented. Here the complaint was short and 
general, and was not divided into more than one claim for 
relief. Rule 18(a), URCP likewise distinguishes plaintiffs1 
"claims". Olympus not having chosen to separate its complaint 
(even as amended) into more than one claim for relief/ cannot 
receive the benefit of piecemeal certification. 
If the certification was improper, no part of the 
judgment would have been final/ and Wasatch would have remained 
in possession until full adjudication of the parties' respective 
rights. Rule 54(b), URCP. 
11. The trial court does not have unbridled discretion. 
It must find separate claims, and that there is no just reason 
for delay. Merely reciting the criteria have been met does not 
mean there is a final judgment. This Court may still find 
otherwise. Little v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). An 
order that does not wholly dispose of a "claim" will not be 
"final". Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); 
Backstrom Family Ltd. Ptnrshp v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Where liability has been determined but the extent of 
damage has not, there is no final order for appellate review. 
Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986). 
Olsen added that this is also true when the trial court's order 
disposes of a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief but 
leaves unresolved other equitable and legal claims for relief. 
12. The trial court should have recognized Wasatch's 
supersedeas bond. As indicated in the preliminary sections of 
this brief, the court first approved a single bond in the amount 
of $100,000. R. 177-178. Later a $300,000 bond and two 
sureties were required. They were filed, but the court found 
one was not properly justified. Though it approved one of the 
$300,000 bonds, the court refused to stay judgment without two, 
and put Wasatch out of the premises and out of business. 
Rent was only $2,750 per month under the original lease, 
and by the time judgment was entered it had been reduced by 
agreement to $2,500, including common area maintenance. See 
Amended Complaint, R. 89-92. So if the appeal lasted a year the 
loss to Olympus for Wasatch to remain in possession would be 
$30,000. Even a two year appeal would not exceed the $100,000 
bond, much less $300,000. 
The court increased the bond requirement to $300,000 
based upon Olympus1 claim that if Wasatch were allowed to stay, 
a new bowling tenant would be lost and the building would need 
to be rebuilt. Wasatch pointed out that even if that assumption 
were valid, the rebuilt structure would benefit Olympus in the 
amount of its value increase, which would be an offset to any 
loss. R. 216, 218. It is hard to determine the court's reason 
for requiring double sureties. 
13. Judgment should have been stayed, since Wasatch 
provided proper security. A stay of post judgment proceedings 
may be granted upon "such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper." Rule 62(a), URCP. Once a bond 
had been filed exceeding two years lost rent, "proper" security 
had been provided. Later having determined that one surety was 
worth the $300,000 bond required, security was more than proper. 
Yet no stay was granted. 
14. Once the bond was approved by the court, a stay was 
required. As indicatedf the $300,000 bond of Rancho Lanes, Inc. 
was approved in all respects. See R. 243-244. The rule states: 
When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a 
stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. 
. . . The stay is effective when the supersedeas 
bond is approved by the court. 
Rule 62(d), URCP. Since a bond was approved, stay should have 
been in effect and no Writ of Restitution should have issued. 
15. Two sureties should not have been required. Wasatch 
has been unable to locate any authority for the court's decision 
to require two sureties, each in the maximum amount requested by 
Olympus. The proceedings for excepting to and justifying the 
sureties is provided by Rule 62(i). A portion provides: 
In all cases where the bond required exceeds $2,000 
and there are more than two sureties thereon, they 
may state in their affidavits that they are 
severally worth the amounts for which they agree to 
be found if less than that expressed in the 
undertaking, provided the whole amount is 
equivalent to that of two sufficient sureties. 
62(i), URCP. So the party seeking the stay may cummulate 
multiple sureties, but is not required to do so. Cummulation is 
only used when the initial bond is not by itself worth the 
required amount. 
16. Appellate rules have inadvertently omitted standards 
for supersedeas bonds. While Rule 62, URCP allows a supersedeas 
bond, it provides no help as to what constitutes a "proper" 
security. Rule 73(d), URCP provided the standard, but was 
deleted with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (now Rules of the Supreme Court and Rules of the Court 
of Appeals) effective 1985. However, the new rules fail to 
properly cover the subject. 
Rule 8 of both appellate courts allows stays pending 
appeal, stating only that it "may be conditioned upon the filing 
of a bond or other appropriate security in the district court." 
Rule 8(b), R. Utah S. Ct.; Rule 8(b), R. Utah Ct. App. There is 
no further provision relating to supersedeas bonds, except to 
state that no cost bond is required where a supersedeas bond has 
been filed. Rule 6, R. Utah S. Ct.; Rule 6, R. Utah Ct. App. 
Supreme Court Clerk Geoffery Butler has acknowledged in 
conversation with counsel that through inadvertence, the 
codifiers of the new appellate rules omitted the provisions of 
the former Rule 73(d), which are as follows: 
(d) Supersedeas bond. Whenever an appellant 
entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may 
present to the court for its approval a supersedeas 
bond which shall have such surety or sureties as 
the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned 
for the satisfaction of the judgment in full 
together with costs, interest and damages for 
delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or 
if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full 
such modification of the judgment and such costs, 
interest, and damages as the appellate court may 
adjudge and award. When the judgment is for the 
recovery of money not otherwise secured, the amount 
of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will 
cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining 
unsatisfied, costs on the appeal, interest, and 
damages for delay, unless the court after notice 
and hearing and for good cause fixes a different 
amount or orders security other than the bond. 
When the judgment determines the disposition of the 
property on controversy as in real actions, 
replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages or 
when such property is in the custody of the sheriff 
or when the proceeds of such property or a bond for 
its value is in the custody or control of the 
court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be 
fixed at such sum only as will secure the amount 
recovered for the use and determination of the 
property, the costs of the action, costs on 
appeal, interest, and damages for delay. 
Former Rule 73(d), URCP (1984). 
The above standard clearly limits the amount the court 
may require of a supersedeas bond and surety. Here the trial 
judge overstepped those bounds. 
17. The appellate rules did not alter the court's 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals rules make 
it clear that the codifiers intended to simply move the appeals 
rules from the Rules of Civil Procedure to the Court's new 
rules, with only minor modifications. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by 
law. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as established 
by law. 
Rule 1(d), R. Utah S. Ct.; 1(d), R. Utah Ct. App. 
Since no other procedure is specified, the Court should 
apply the standard under pre-existing law, unless there is some 
indication the standard was abandoned intentionally or replaced 
by a new one. Under that standard, the supersedeas bond amount 
is limited to the rental value of the property, interest, costs 
and damages. There would have been no money judgment stayed, 
onlv Dossession. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in allowing judgment in the action, 
begun as one for unlawful detainer, without requiring the proper 
statutory notices to be served again. The certification for 
appeal was improper, and restitution should have been stayed 
upon filing of Wasatch's supersedeas bond. 
Wasatch requests that the trial court's ruling be 
reversed, and that it be required to issue a new order restoring 
Wasatch to possession of the bowling alley. 
Respectfully so requested this 15th day of December, 
1989. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to 
hold over. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
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rerenting by owner — Liability of ten-
ant — Personal property of tenant left 
on premises. 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who ei-
ther: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circum-
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real prop-
erty, turns out by force, threats or menacing con-
duct the party in actual possession. 1863 
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined. 
Every* person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio-
lence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was ac-
quired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of 
the occupants of any real property, unlawfully 
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three 
days to surrender the same to such former occu-
pant. The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within 
five days preceding such unlawful entry* was in 
the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands. 1953 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term 
less than life. 
(DA tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe-
riod for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol 
shall be terminated without notice at the expira-
tion of the specified term or period: 
(b) when, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved 
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-
son or by subtenant after the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner, 
his designated agent, or any successor in es-
tate of the owner. 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five 
days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default m the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due: 
(d* when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi-
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
or 
tei when he continue? in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held. 
other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him and 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days 
after service. Within three days after the service 
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person interested in its contin-
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-
formed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16. Title 
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. I»HH 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to 
hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands. 
where the tenant has held over and retained posses-
sion for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to 
quit by the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permis-
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succes-
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the 
terms of the lease for another full year, and shall not 
be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year, 
and the holding over for the 60-day period shall be 
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taken and construed as a consent on the part of the 
tenant to hold for another year. 1981 
78-36-5. R e m e d i e s ava i lable to tenant against 
undertenant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those 
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 1953 
78-36-6. Not ice to quit — H o w served . 
The notices required by the preceding sections may 
be served: 
(1) bv delivering a copy to the tenant person-
ally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or 
certified mail addressed to the tenant at his place 
of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a 
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion 
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business: or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can-
not be found at the place of residence, then by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the 
leased property. Service upon a subtenant may 
be made in the same manner. 1987 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
No person other than the tenant of the premises, 
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation 
of the premises when the action is commenced, need 
be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor 
shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non-
suited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might 
have been made a party defendant; but when it ap-
pears that any of the parties served with process or 
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment 
must be rendered against them. In case a person has 
become subtenant of the premises in controversy af-
ter the service of any notice in this chapter provided 
for, the fact that such notice was not served on such 
subtenant shall constitute no defense to the action. 
All persons who enter under the tenant after the com-
mencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made par-
ties to the action. 1953 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set 
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence 
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible 
entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim 
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation 
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer 
charged is after default in the payment of rent, the 
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The 
court shall indorse on the summons the number of 
days within which the defendant is required to ap-
pear and defend the action, which shall not be less 
than three or more than 20 days from the date of 
service The court may authorize service by publica-
tion or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is 
complete one week after publication. Service by mail 
is complete three days after mailing. The summons 
shali be changed in form to conform to the time of 
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
cases. 1987 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter-
native remedies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint 
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may 
execute and file a possession bond. The bond may be 
in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons 
who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The court shall approve the 
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons and shall inform the 
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and pro-
cedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and pro-
cedures applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a 
possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer ac-
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or 
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in 
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the 
defendant, within three days of the service of the 
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee. and other costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees, as provided in the rental 
agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if 
he executes and files a counter bond in the form 
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who 
own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at 
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the fil-
ing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall 
approve the bond in an amount that is the proba-
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages 
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant 
has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a por-
tion of the defendant's total bond. 
{a The defendant, upon demand, shall be 
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expira-
tion of three days from the date the defendant is 
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs pos-
session bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with 
a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the prop-
erty is situated shall return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Sub-
section (2MC), and if the court rules after the hearing 
that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the prop-
erty, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the 
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be adjudi-
cated between the parties, the court shall require the 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection 
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues 
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur-
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ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi-
cating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
1987 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense . 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry 
or forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be re-
quired to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, tha t he was peace-
ably in the actual possession a t the t ime of the forc-
ible entry, or was entitled to the possession a t the 
t ime of the forcible detainer. The defendant may 
show in his defense tha t he or his ancestors, or those 
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for t he space of one 
whole year continuously next before the commence-
ment of the proceedings, and t h a t his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is 
a bar to the proceedings. 1953 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, 
and rent — Immediate enforcement — 
Treble damages. 
( D A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condi-
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
va) forcible entry; 
(b» forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defen-
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com-
plaint and proved at trial; and 
id) the amount of rent due. if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2Ha) through 
(2uct, and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful deta iner after 
default in the payment of the rent , execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment . In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately 1987 
78-36-11. T i m e for appeal . 
Ei ther party may, within ten days, appeal from the 
judgment rendered. 1953 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-36-12.3, Def in i t ions . 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenants personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking 
and rerenting by owner — Liability of 
tenant — Personal property of tenant 
left on premises. 
(' D In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term: or 
ib) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (a) notwithstanding that the owner did not 
re-rent the premises 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and 
has left personal property on the premises, the owner 
is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, 
store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant. The owner shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the location 
of the personal property; however, if the property has 
been in storage for over 30 days and the tenant has 
made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner 
may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward 
any amount the tenant owes. Any money left over 
from the sale of the property shall be handled as spec-
ified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this 
act shall be in derogation of or alter the owner's 
rights under Chapter 3, Title 38. 19» 
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Section 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special 
execution. 
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution. 
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded rights 
barred. 
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus moneys. 
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in installments. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 18 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations 
and Clubs §§ 50, 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign 
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 41 Am. Jur. 2d In-
competent Persons §§ 115tol21;42 Am. Jur. 
2d Infants §§ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am. Jur. 2d 
Parties §§ 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255; 60 Am. 
Jur. 2d Partnership § 324. 
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 36, 38; 20 
C.J.S. Corporations § 1828 et seq.; 21 C.J.S. 
Courts § 76; 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 108, 110; 44 
C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 133 to 146; 67 C.J.S. 
Parties §§ 17, 18, 133 to 138; 68 C.J.S. Part-
nership § 206 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's 
guardian, committee or next friend to sue for 
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of 
marriage, or to make a compromise or settle-
ment in such suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681. 
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140. 
Insurance, proper party plaintiff, under real 
party in interest statute, to action against tort-
feasor for damage to insured property where 
loss is entirely covered bv insurance, 13 
A.L.R.3d 229. 
State Consumer Protection Act, right to pri-
vate action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 18, F.R.C.P. 
Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship 
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813. 
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's 
theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64 
A.L.R.3d 1207. 
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to 
common areas of condominium development, 
69 A.L.R.3d 1148. 
Condominium, standing to bring action re-
lating to title in real propertv of, 72 A.L.R.3d 
314. 
Necessary or proper parties to suit or pro-
ceeding to establish private boundary line, 73 
A.L.R.3d 948. 
Necessity of requiring presence in court of 
both parties in proceedings relating to custody 
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864. 
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action 
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082. 
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48 
A.L.R.4th 860. 
Joint ventures capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1234. 
Key Numbers. —- Associations «=» 20, 26; 
Corporations <^ 662; Courts «= 12; Infants <^> 
78, 80; Mental Health «=> 471 to 497; Parties «= 
1, 2, 6, 8, 21; Partnerships «=» 191. 
Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies. 
(a) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting 
forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counter-
claim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims 
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. 
There may be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the 
requirements of Rules 19, 20, and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder 
of cross-claims or third-party claims if the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 
respectively are satisfied. 
(b) Joinder of remedies; fraudulent conveyances. Whenever a claim is 
one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been prosecuted to a 
conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but the court shall 
grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative substantive 
rights of the parties. In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and 
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first 
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money. 
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Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
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file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. For 
present provisions, see Rule 34(d) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court and the Committee 
Note thereto, and Rule 34(d) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — As to costs on ap-
peals, see Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Continuances, discretion to require payment 
of costs, Rule 40(b). 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs, 
§ 49-6-301. 
State, pavment of costs awarded against, 
§ 78-27-13. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule 
62(h)." 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
—In general. 
—Challenge of award. 
—Depositions. 
—Discretionary. 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
—Failure to object. 
—Liability of state. 
—Service on adverse party. 
—Statutory limits. 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
—Claims for relief. 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Interest on judgment. 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory. 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Pleading in the alternative. 
Presumption of finality. 
Real party in interest. 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Specific performance request. 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Cited. 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would 
be subject, on remand, to revision since all 
claims presented had not been adjudicated and 
since trial court made no express determina-
tion as required by this section. M. & S. Constr. 
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and 
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amend-
ments should be allowed where a case has ac-
tually been tried on a different issue or a differ-
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was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
 t r i a l o r f l l i n g o f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
§ § C . j S - S CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f f^™ to *fe K n o t i c e °ff aPP l i c a t l™ J r de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- [a u l t J^gment where notice is required only 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d b v custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
2070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—-Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Summary judgment. 
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the error was prejudicial to the extent that credited to the buyer the amount that was due 
there is reasonable likelihood that in its ab- to him, and entered judgment only for the dif-
sence there would have been a different result. ference. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952). 
Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960»; „ . , „
 T7 t OJ _ 
Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d C l * £ i n s <** v Geurts. 11 Utah 2d 345 
406 (1963); Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 3 * 9 p-2<* 12 (1961), Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); 2d 364, 412 P 2d 451 (1966); Estate of 
Redevelopment Agencvv. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 McFarland v. Holt 18 Utah 2d 12/, 41/ P.2d 
P2d 1370 (Utah 1974) 244 (1966); Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 
An appellate court will not reverse a judg- j*2 P-2d 1276 (Utah 1976>; Rigtrupv Straw-
ment for mere error, unless the error involved ^ n y *a ter Users Ass n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v. 1T9771)' Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). ( L t a h 1980) ' ' S t a t * e x r e l K K H ' 6 1 0 P 2 d 8 4 9 
(Utah 1980); Chournos v. D'Agnillo. 642 P.2d 
Trial error corrected in judgment. 710 (Utah 1982); Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 
A buyer under a conditional sales contract 1086 (Utah 1985); Chandler v. Mathews. 734 
was not prejudiced by a conclusion of law in P.2d 907 (Utah 1987); Mountain States Tel. & 
which inadvertently no credit had been given Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 1988); 
to him for an amount that was due to him, and Painter v. Painter. 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. 
according to which the seller was thus entitled App. 1988); Belden v. Dalbo. Inc., 752 P.2d 
to a judgment in a certain larger sum. where 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1988»; King v. Barron, 95 
the court, in arriving at its judgment, correctly Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and §§ 1778 to 1800, 1894 to 1907; 66 C.J.S. New-
Error §§ 702, 776 to 819; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial £ 13 
Trial § 31. Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error e=> 1025 
C.J.S. — 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error to 10*74. 1170; New Trial «=> 27. 
§S 1676 to 1777; 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error 
Rule 62, Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to en-
force a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment, 
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion and 
on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending 
the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment 
made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order 
made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a 
motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for 
amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 
52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interloc-
utory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction 
during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper 
for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohib-
ited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is ap-
proved by the court. 
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(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. When an appeal is 
taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, 
or by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement 
of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be 
required from the appellant. 
(0 Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where the defendant is adjudged 
guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed 
on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The provisions in this rule do 
not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction, writ of mandate or writ of prohibition during the 
pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status 
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple claims. When a court has ordered a 
final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under 
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that 
judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may 
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the 
party in whose favor the judgment is entered. 
(i) Excepting to sureties; justification; multiple sureties; deposit in 
lieu of bond. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties 
to the undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this rule at any time 
within 10 days after written notice of the filing of such undertakings; and, 
unless they or other sureties, within 10 days after service of the notice of such 
exception, justify before a judge of the court in which the judgment was en-
tered, or the clerk thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the party 
excepting to such sureties of the time and place of justification, execution of 
the judgment is no longer stayed. In all cases where the bond required exceeds 
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in their 
affidavits that they are severally worth the amounts for which they agree to 
be found if less than that expressed in the undertaking, provided the whole 
amount is equivalent to that of two sufficient sureties. In all cases where an 
undertaking is required by these rules a deposit in court in the amount of such 
undertaking, or such lesser amount as the court may order, is equivalent to 
the filing of the undertaking. 
(j) Waiver of undertaking. In all cases the parties may by written stipula-
tion waive the requirements of this rule with respect to the filing of a bond or 
undertaking. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Bond for costs on ap-
Rule 62, F R C P . peal, R. Utah S. Ct.. Rule 6. 
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Rule 73. Procedure in taking an appeal. 
(a) through (g) [Deleted.] 
(h) Appeal from a judgment rendered in a city or justice court. An 
appeal may be taken to the district court from a final judgment rendered in a 
city or justice court within one month after notice of the entry of such judg-
ment, or within such shorter time as may be provided by law. The party 
appealing shall within the time allowed, serve upon the adverse party a notice 
of appeal and file the same, together with a copy thereof, either in the court 
from which the appeal is taken or in the district court to which the appeal is 
taken; provided that such notice shall show on its face the title of the court in 
which it is filed. The appeal shall be dismissed by the district court to which 
taken upon motion and notice, unless at the time of filing the notice of appeal 
the party appealing shall deposit into court the fees required by law to be paid 
in connection therewith, including both the fees for the lower court and for 
docketing the appeal in the district court. 
(i) Notice to be given and fees remitted to other court. Immediately 
upon receipt of the notice of appeal and the fees required to be paid, the clerk 
of the court in which the appeal is filed shall mail a copy of such notice, 
together with the fees required, to the clerk of the other court. 
(j) Record to be transmitted. Within ten days after receipt of the notice of 
appeal, or a copy thereof, the lower court shall transmit to the clerk of the 
district court a certified copy of the docket or register of actions, the original 
pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case, and the 
notice and undertaking on appeal, if filed in the lower court. 
(k) Bond on appeal. At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appel-
lant shall file with such notice a bond for costs on appeal in accordance with 
the provisions of Rule 73(c), except that the amount of such bond shall be 
$100.00. The appellant may likewise, under the condition of Rule 62 and in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 73. relating to appeals to the Supreme 
Court, obtain a stay of execution pending an appeal, provided, that any excep-
tion to the appellant's sureties shall be made in the district court to which the 
appeal is taken and justification of such sureties shall be before the clerk or a 
judge of such court. 
(1) Dismissal of appeal — Penalty for delay. Failure of the appellant to 
take any of the further steps to secure the review of the case, except filing 
notice of appeal and depositing the fees therefor, shall not affect the validity of 
the appeal but is ground for such action as the district court deems appropri-
ate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of the cause on 
appeal, if it appears to the court that the appeal was made solely for delay, it 
may add to the costs such damages as may be just, not exceeding twenty-five 
percent of the judgment appealed from. 
(m) [Deleted.] 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to 
(g> and Subdivision (m), relating to the notice 
of appeal and the required bond, were deleted 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure (now the Rules of the Utah Su-
preme Court), effective January 1, 1985. For 
present provisions, see Rules 3, 4, 6 to 8, 11 
and 12, R. Utah S. Ct. 
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 73(c), referred to 
in Subdivision (k), has been repealed. See now 
Rule 6, R Utah S. Ct 
There is no federal rule covering this subject 
matter. 
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TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES. 
RULE 
1. Scope of rules. 
2. Suspension of rules. 
TITLE II. APPEALS PROM JUDGMENTS 
AND ORDERS. 
3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
4. Appeal as of right: When taken. 
4A. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to 
Court of Appeals. 
4B. Certification by the Court of Appeals to 
the Supreme Court. 
4C. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory 
Orders. 
6. Bond for costs on appeal. 
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties. 
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
9. Docketing statement. 
10. Motions for summary disposition. 
11. The record on appeal. 
12. Transmission of the record. 
13. Notice of filing by clerk of Court of Ap-
peals. 
TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, 
COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES. 
14. Review of administrative orders: How ob-
tained; intervention. 
15. Record on review. 
16. Filing of record. 
17. Stay pending review. 
18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS; 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
RULE 
19. Extraordinary writs. 
20. Habeas corpus proceedings. 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
21. Filing and service. 
22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
23. Motions. 
24. Briefs. 
25 Brief of an amicus curiae. 
26. Filing and service of briefs. 
27. Form of briefs, petitions, motions, and 
other papers. 
28. Prehearing conference. 
29. Oral argument. 
30. Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of 
decision. 
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argu-
ment without written opinion. 
32. Interest on judgment 
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; re-
covery of attorney fees. 
34. Award of costs. 
35. Petition for rehearing. 
36. Issuance of remittitur. 
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismis-
sal. 
38. Substitution of parties. 
39. Duties of the clerk. 
40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions 
and discipline. 
INDEX TO RULES. 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES. 
Rule 1. Scope of rules, 
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure before the 
Utah Court of Appeals in all cases. When these rules provide for a motion or 
application to be made in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an administra-
tive agency, commission, or board, the procedure for making such motion or 
application shall be governed by the practice of the district, juvenile, or circuit 
court or the administrative agency, commission, or board. 
(b) Applicability of rules to review of juvenile or circuit court pro-
ceedings. Whenever in these rules reference is made to practice and proce-
dure in appeals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a district court, 
said rules shall have equal application, force, and effect with regard to prac-
tice and procedure in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile or 
circuit court. 
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(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state 
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency, 
commission, or board or an officer of the state which is inconsistent with one 
or more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules 
shall apply as to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and abbreviated R. Utah Ct. App. 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court of Appeals, on its own 
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of 
Rules 4(a), 4(e), and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions of any of 
these rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in 
accordance with its direction. 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. As defined and pro-
vided by law, an appeal may be taken from the final orders and judgments of a 
district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any 
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the Court of 
Appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or 
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or an order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or join in an appeal of 
another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals 
may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal with a single appel-
lant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals 
on its own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the 
Court of Appeals, the party making the original application shall be known as 
the plaintiff and any other party as the defendant. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals. 
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proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within 
the time required, for appeals from final judgments. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill, 762 P.2d 1102 (Utah 
v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ct. App. 1988). 
Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal. 
At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such 
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the 
adverse party or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed. The bond 
shall be in the sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as the court 
from which the appeal is taken may order on motion of the respondent to 
ensure payment of costs on appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is 
required when a supersedeas bond is filed. The bond on appeal shall be with 
sufficient sureties and shall be conditioned to secure payment of costs if the 
appeal is dismissed, the judgment is reversed or affirmed, or the judgment is 
modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
the appellant makes and files with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken an affidavit in the form set out in U.C.A., 1953, § 21-7-3, as 
amended, no bond on appeal shall be required. This rule shall have no applica-
tion in a criminal case. 
Rule 7. Security: Proceedings against sureties. 
Whenever these rules require or permit the giving of security by a party 
and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking 
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent therein to the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the surety by the court from which the appeal is 
taken and must irrevocably appoint the clerk of that court as the surety's 
agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or 
undertaking may be served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion 
without the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of 
the motion as the court from which the appeal is taken prescribes may be 
served on the clerk of that court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the sure-
ties if their addresses are known. 
Rule 8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in first instance in district court, 
juvenile court, or circuit court; motion for stay in Court of Appeals. 
Application for a stay of the judgment or order of a district court, juvenile 
court, or circuit court pending appeal, for approval of a supersedeas bond, or 
for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction dur-
ing the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in 
the court from which the appeal is taken. A motion for such relief may be 
made to the Court of Appeals, but the motion shall show that application to 
the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court for the relief sought is not 
practicable or that such court has denied an application or has failed to afford 
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the relief which the applicant requested, with the reasons given by that court 
for its action. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested 
and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion 
shall be supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. 
With the motion shall be filed such parts of the record as are relevant. Reason-
able notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed 
with the clerk and normally will be considered by a panel of the court, but in 
exceptional cases where such procedure would be impracticable due to the 
requirements of time, the application may be made to and considered by a 
single judge of the court subject to review by a panel. 
(b) Stay may be conditioned upon giving of bond. Relief available in 
the Court of Appeals under this rule may be conditioned upon the filing of a 
bond or other appropriate security in the court from which an appeal is 
sought. 
(c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal cases pending appeal to the 
court are governed and shall be had in accordance with U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 77-35-27, as amended (Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
Advisory Committee Note. — The require- admit the defendant to bail or release pending 
ments that must be met under Section appeal, have been delineated in State v. 
77-35-27, Utah R. Crim. P. 27, to obtain a cer- Neeley, 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). 
tificate of probable cause, which is necessary to 
Rule 9. Docketing statement. 
(a) Filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal or a petition for review is 
filed, the appellant or the petitioner shall file the original of a docketing 
statement, together with five copies and proof of service, with the clerk of the 
Court of Appeals if the case is subject to the exclusive original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Docketing statements in cases which may 
be transferred to the Court of Appeals for decision shall be filed with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court unless an order transferring the case to the Court of 
Appeals has been entered. 
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a 
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is to be used 
by the court in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded a 
case and in making certifications to the Supreme Court, summary disposi-
tions, and calendar assignments. 
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall con-
tain the following information in the order set forth below: 
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of 
all motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; the date and effect of all orders disposing of such 
motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for review was 
filed. 
(2) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on 
the Court of Appeals to decide the appeal, the petition for review, or in the 
case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of the court order allowing the 
appeal and the issues which may be appealed pursuant to the granting of 
the interlocutory appeal. Particular attention should be paid to the re-
quirements of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if an appeal is 
from an order in a multiple-party or a multiple-claim case. 
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peals or proceedings from an order or judgment of a district court, said rules 
shall have equal application, force and effect with regard to practice and 
procedure in appeals from orders or judgments from a juvenile court. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is provided by state 
statute as to the appeal or review of an order of an administrative agency, 
commission, board, or officer of the state which is inconsistent with one or 
more of these rules, the statute shall govern. In other respects, these Rules 
shall apply as to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be construed to 
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by law. 
(e) Title, These rules shall be known as the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and abbreviated R. Utah S. Ct. 
(Amended, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(a), (c). These rules are applicable to appeals 
from a district court and a juvenile court and 
from appeals or reviews of an administrative 
agency, commission or board. 
These rules are applicable to and govern 
practice and procedure in criminal as well as in 
civil cases. While $ 77-35-26 Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended (Rule 26 Ctah Code of Crim-
inal Procedure) provides for appeals to the su-
preme court from district and circuit courts, 
the procedure and practice for taking such ap-
peals, including the time in which the appeal is 
filed, shall be prescribed by these rules. These 
rules do not alter, change, or abridge the sub-
stantive rights of a defendant or the state in 
criminal cases before the court. 
Upon the effective date of these rules, if a 
statute provides for a procedure of appeal from 
a district or lower court to the supreme court 
which is inconsistent or in conflict with these 
rules, the rules shall control. Section 78-2-4 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. However, 
as set forth in paragraph ic), if a method or 
manner of appeal or review of an order of a 
state administrative agency, commission, 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction. 
Scope of review. 
Jurisdiction. 
These rules do not confer jurisdiction. Greg-
board or officer provided by Utah statute is in-
consistent or in conflict with any of these rule9, 
the statute shall govern. 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph makes it 
clear that these rules apply to appellate prac-
tice and procedure before the supreme court in 
appeals and proceedings from orders and judg-
ments of a juvenile court. Section 78-3a-51 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Whenever 
the terms "district court" or "clerk of the dis-
trict court" are used in these rules they shall 
be interchangeable with the terms "juvenile 
court" and "clerk of the juvenile court" as they 
relate to appellate practice and procedure be-
fore the supreme court in juvenile court pro-
ceedings. 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court and abbreviated R. Utah S. Ct." for 
"Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or abbre-
viated U.R.A.P." in Subdivision (e). 
Cross-References. — Criminal cases, ap-
peals, § 77-35-26. 
Rulemaking power of Supreme Court, 
§ 78-2-4. 
ory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1987). 
Scope of review. 
The Supreme Court has its broadest scope of 
appellate review in an appeal from the exercise 
of equity powers. State ex rel. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Procedure. If the appellant makes and files with the clerk of the court from 
which the appeal is taken, an affidavit in the form set out in § 21-7-3, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953 as amended, no bond on appeal shall be required. This rule 
shall have no application in a criminal case. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule re-
quires the appellant to file a cost bond at the 
same time the notice of appeal is filed, unless 
the respondent waives the requirement, or un-
less the appellant files an affidavit of 
impecuniosity. Section 21-7-3 Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended. The purpose of the cost bond 
is to give the respondent security for the pay-
ment of such costs as may be awarded to him 
under the provisions of Rule 33 in the event 
that the appellant is unsuccessful in his ap-
peal. This rule is essentially derived from for-
mer Rule 73(c) and (d), and does not represent 
a substantial modification of current practice. 
Compiler's Notes. — The cases annotated 
under this rule interpreted the provisions of 
former Rules 72 to 76, U.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to file. 
Supersedeas bond. 
—Adequacy. 
—Damages. 
Speculative. 
—When required. 
When filed. 
Failure to file. 
Failure to file an appeal bond is not jurisdic-
tional, although it may be grounds for dismis-
sal of an appeal in appropriate circumstances. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1984). 
Supersedeas bond. 
—Adequacy. 
A motion to dismiss an appeal due to inade-
quacies of plaintiffs' supersedeas bond is a mat-
ter which calls for a factual determination, and 
necessitates the taking of evidence. Because 
the Supreme Court will not take evidence, it 
will direct the district court to take any evi-
dence it may deem appropriate and to rule 
upon the question as to the adequacy of the 
Corresponding Rule 7 FRAP leaves the mat-
ter of the posting of a cost bond to the discre-
tion of the district court. However, the commit-
tee was concerned that, if Utah were to follow 
the federal format, the district court would be 
subjected to numerous motions seeking to set 
the amount of a cost bond on a case by case 
basis. Accordingly, the committee concluded 
that the better approach would be to presump-
tively require a $300 cost bond, but allow the 
respondent to request that a higher amount be 
required in a particular case. 
supersedeas bond. Swasev v. Rockey Point 
Ditch Co., 649 P.2d 1 (Utah 1982). 
—Damages. 
Speculative. 
Plaintiffs' contention that they were enti-
tled, as the amount for the defendant's use and 
detention of property during appeal, to the 
rental value of the land for agricultural pur-
poses they intended to use land for, when in 
fact the land was undeveloped sagebrush 
ground at the time a supersedeas bond was 
filed, was akin to a claim made for loss of pro-
spective profits which were too uncertain and 
speculative to form a basis for recovery. Jen-
kins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 
(1953). 
—When required. 
An appellant is not bound to furnish a super-
sedeas bond; rather, it is only necessary if the 
appellant wishes to restrain the successful 
party and the lower court from taking affirma-
tive action to enforce a judgment or decree. 
Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979). 
When filed. 
Court has discretion to allow the bond to be 
filed subsequent to the procedural time where 
no prejudice is shown to the respondent. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
427 
Rule 6 RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
request for discovery of testimony of witnesses 
before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake County 
Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976). 
Determination regarding substantial 
rights. 
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered 
when her son's car, in which she was riding, 
collided with a cow which had fallen on high-
way from defendant's truck, preliminary order 
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the 
truck was negligence as a matter of law and 
that the trial should be held only on the issue 
of damages involved substantial rights of the 
parties and would materially affect the final 
decision and, therefore, was subject to an inter-
mediate appeal. Klafla v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 
65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965). 
Irreparable damage. 
Temporary order allocating water usage by 
plaintiff pending further study by court raised 
sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending 
the filing of the final order fixing and decree-
ing the water rights of the respective parties as 
to be appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah 
2d 77, 348 P.2d 679 (1960). 
Order vacating summary judgment. 
A party does not have an appeal as a matter 
of right from an order vacating a summary 
judgment but may seek an appeal pursuant to 
Subdivision (a). Jensen v. Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 
23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). 
Purpose in granting. 
The purpose to be served in granting an in-
terlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dis-
pose of the issues as quickly as possible, consis-
tent with thoroughness and efficiency in the 
administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 
Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). 
When to grant 
The desired objective of efficiency in proce-
dure can be promoted, and an interlocutory ap-
peal is properly granted, if it appears essential 
to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in 
advance as a necessary foundation upon which 
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high like-
lihood that the litigation can be finally dis-
posed of on such an appeal. Manwill v. Oyler, 
11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). 
Whenever it appears likely that the matters 
in dispute can be finally disposed of upon a 
trial, or where they may become moot, or 
where they can, without involving any serious 
difficulty, abide determination in the event of 
an appeal after the trial, the desired objective 
of efficient administration of justice is best 
served by refusing to entertain an interlocu-
tory appeal and letting the case proceed to 
trial. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 
P.2d 177 (1961). 
Where defendant landowner, by motion to 
dismiss the complaint, challenged the plain-
tiffs authority to condemn defendant's land 
and such motion was denied, an appropriate 
situation for intermediate appeal was pre-
sented since determination of the issue raised 
by the motion might eliminate the necessity 
for further proceedings or trial. Great Salt 
Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 
45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966). 
Cited in All Weather Insulation, Inc. v. 
Amiron Dev. Corp., 702 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error ^ 50 to 64. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error *§ 92 et 
seq. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error * 
seq. 
>66et 
Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal. 
At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such 
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is waived in writing by the 
adverse party, or unless an affidavit as hereinafter described is filed. The bond 
shall be in the sum of at least $300.00, or such greater amount as the district 
court may order on motion of the respondent to ensure payment of costs on 
appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is required when a supersedeas 
bond is filed. The bond on appeal shall be with sufficient sureties and shall be 
conditioned to secure payment of costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judg-
ment affirmed, or of such costs as the Supreme Court may award if the judg-
ment is modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the 
sureties in accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah Rules of Civil 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and recoverable under supersedeas bond in action 
Error §§ 323 to 344. involving recovery or possession of real estate, 
C.J.S. — 4A C J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 499 9 A.L.R.3d 330. 
to 573. Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *» 369 
A.L.R. — Measure and amount of damages to 395. 
Rule 7. Security; proceedings against sureties. 
Whenever these rules require or permit the giving of security by a party, 
and security is given in the form of a bond or stipulation or other undertaking 
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent therein to the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over him by the district court and must irrevocably ap-
point the clerk of the district court as his agent upon whom any papers affect-
ing his liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. His liability may 
be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action. The 
motion and such notice of the motion as the district court prescribes may be 
served on the clerk of the district court who shall forthwith mail copies to the 
sureties if their addresses are known. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule necessity of an independent action. Prior prac-
provides that the surety on a bond submits tice under Rule 73(f) URCivP is generally 
himself to the jurisdiction of the district court, maintained. 
and appoints the clerk of the district court as The district court in question will presum-
e s agent for service of process of any papers
 ably be that from which the case was appealed, 
affecting the surety's liability on the bond. The
 e x c e p t i n c a s e s o f o n g i n a i actions, in which 
rule also makes it clear that the liability of the
 c a s e g < t r a d i t l o n a l v e n U e concepts should apply, 
surety may be enforced on motion, without the 
Rule 8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
(a) Stay must ordinarily be sought in the first instance in district 
court; motion for stay in Supreme Court. Application for a stay of the 
judgment or order of a district court pending appeal, or for approval of a 
supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring or grant-
ing an injunction during the pendency of an appeal must ordinarily be made 
in the first instance in the district court. A motion for such relief may be made 
to the Supreme Court, but the motion shall show that application to the 
district court for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the district court 
has denied an application, or has failed to afford the relief which the applicant 
requested, with the reasons given by the district court for its action. The 
motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the facts relied 
upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute the motion shall be supported by 
affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. With the motion shall 
be filed such parts of the record as are relevant. Reasonable notice of the 
motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be filed with the clerk 
and normally will be considered by the court, but in exceptional cases where 
such procedure sould be impracticable due to the requirements of time, the 
application may be made to and considered by a single justice of the court. 
lb) Stay must be conditional upon giving of bond. Relief available in 
the Supreme Court under this rule may be conditioned upon the filing of a 
bond or other appropriate security in the district court. 
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A MEM#f* Or rrm %CKM-, FINANCIAL MTrwun* 
AANIgeRQ 
June 20, 1988 
COLDwEt.L 0ANKCA 
COMMERCIAL RgAL ESTATE SERVICES, 
• div*rtvi ol C»0w*i B*n&rf Commtrc** Gioup. inc. 
*JAST INTERSTATE BUILDJNG 
UC SOUTH MAIN STKEET. S L ! T £ 1«C 
SALT LAKE OTY UTAH ¥4101-1605 
Mr. Wesley Sine 
WASATCH BOWLING 
640 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Dear Mr. Sine: 
LETTER OF AGREEMENT 
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager 
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in 
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to: 
1) Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000.00 versus 10% of the 
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988, mo*!*1 im^-
2) Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately 
$2,500.00 per month. 
3) Merchants dues will remain at SI50.00 per month. 
4) Monthly payment on the Pxanissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be 
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to $580.00 per month, interest only. 
This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 31, 1990 at the 
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also 
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable. 
Richard Skankey / Date 
^7-a-& 
Vcslcy Sine / Date < 
APPENDIX I I I . 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
ton 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LIMITED, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
CIVIL NO. C87-8427 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff complains of defendant and alleges: 
1. Plaintiff is a duly registered Utah limited partnership 
doing business at all times material hereto in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Wasatch Bowling, Inc. is a Utah corporation 
having its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
-1-
3. On or about the 10th day of September, 1984, defendant 
entered into a written Lease Agreement with plaintiff under which 
defendant agreed to lease certain real property in the Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center located at 4015 South Wasatch Blvd., Salt 
lake City, Utah. A true and accurate copy of said L€>ase 
Agreement is attached to plaintiff's original complaint as 
Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof. 
4. Pursuant to the terms of said Lease Agreememt, 
defendant agreed to pay rent at the rate of $2,750.00 per month, 
common area maintenance charges and other assessments throughout 
the ten-year term of the lease. 
5. On or about July 13, 1988, plaintiff and defendant 
signed a letter of agreement, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
6. Defendant has failed to make payments due to plaintiff 
under the terms of the said September 10, 1984 lease agreement or 
the July 13, 1988 letter of agreement. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to the immediate restitution of 
the subject premises and to payment of all amounts due under the 
terms of the September 10, 1984 lease agreement, as amended, in 
the amount of $140,990.54. 
-2-
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant as 
follows: 
1. For the issuance of a Writ of Restitution to restore 
possession of the premises to the plaintiff and to evict the 
defendant, 
2. For past-due rent and other charges accruing under the 
lease as amended in the total amount of $140,990.54, 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees. 
4. For such other damages as may be allowed under the 
Lease Agreement as amended or under law as may be more 
specifically proved at the time of trial hereon or at a later 
date. 
5. For costs of suit incurred herein, interest and such 
other further relief as the court may deem proper. 
DATED this day of December, 1988. 
KESLER & RUST 
mlAUA 
Sc6tt 0. Mercer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1:comp.sine 
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A MEMdEfc Of rnt KAB-, VtKAMOU. HFrwUM 
coLouieu. 
BANIieRQ 
June 20, J 988 
COLDwEa BANKER 
COMMESOAl WEAL ESTATE SERVICES, 
• d>v*i6« of Co-cw**l Banner Comm*rc*> Gioup. Uic. 
PjAbT JNTERSTfcTe BgiLDJNG 
170 SOUTH MAIN STKEET SUITE 1*00 
SALT LA*e CtTY UTAH *M01-16C5 
Mr. Wesley Sine 
WASATCH BOWLING 
640 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Dear Mr. Sine: 
LETTER OF AGREEMENT 
Pursuant to the letter dated 3/31/88 from David R. Kocherhans, Property Manager 
for Coldwell Banker Real Estate Management Services, pertaining to reduction in 
rent the following is what Richard Skankey has agreed to: 
1) Monthly rent shall be reduced to $4,000,00 versus 10% of th<$ 
gross receipts whichever is greater beginning April 1, 1988. mowrt im^ 
2) Monthly rent shall include all CAM charges which are approximately 
$2,500,00 per month. 
3) Merchants dues will remain at $150.00 per month. 
4) Monthly payment on the Promissory Note dated October 12, 1987 shall be 
reduced from $1,200.00 per month to $580.00 per month, interest only. 
This agreement will extend for the period of two years to March 3J, 1990 at the 
end of which time the regular lease payments will resume and at this time also 
the full amount of the Promissory Note will be due and payable. 
Richard Skankey / Date 
7-Q-80 
/csley Sine / Date 
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APPENDIX IV. 
APR 2 8 1989 
SAL! j>i 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
SCOTT 0. MERCER (3834) 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING CENTER, 
LIMITED, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WASATCH BOWLING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. C87-8427 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson on Friday, 
April 14, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing by 
and through its counsel of record, Scott 0. Mercer of Kesler & 
Rust, and defendant appearing by and through its counsel of 
record, Ronald C. Barker. The court, having reviewed plaintiff's 
motion for partial summary judgment, the supporting memorandum, 
the affidavit of Lauren B. Hunt and the opposing memorandum of 
defendant, and having heard the argument of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, it is hereby 
-1-
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment be and is hereby granted in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant, and that a writ of restitution 
issue from the clerk of the court restoring possession of the 
subject premises to plaintiff Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. 
and evicting defendant Wasatch Bowling, Inc. and all others 
occupying the said premises by, through or under defendant 
forthwith, which premises are more particularly described as 
Wasatch Bowling Lanes, 4015 South Wasatch Boulevard, Holladay, 
Utah. Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay and hereby directs the entry of this partial 
summary judgment as a final judgment. At a later date, the court 
may determine the amount of rent and other expenses due under the 
lease agreement. 
DATED this X %~ day of ^?b~-^^ , 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
By~Z^Z. 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby declare that I caused to be hand-delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Partial Summary Judgment in 
Civil No. C-87-8427, this / / day of April, 1989, to: 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
y ^ ^ 
1:parsumju.sine 
-3-
